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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine is an extremely 
robust claim preclusion device that requires adversaries to 
join all possible claims stemming from an event or series of 
events in one suit. Animated by the laudable goal of easing 
the burdens of excessive litigation, the doctrine was 
developed in the domestic context, precluding suits in New 
Jersey courts based on disputes that were previously the 
subject of litigation in New Jersey courts. It has attained 
interjurisdictional proportions, however, and has been used 
in New Jersey to preclude claims based on a failure to effect 
joinder in previous litigation in non-New Jersey courts, 
where such joinder was not required by those courts' own 
rules. The repercussions of the doctrine have prompted 
adverse scholarly comment. See generally Symposium: 
Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28 Rutgers L.J. 1 (1996).1 
 
This case began with a helicopter crash, though the facts 
have little bearing on the issue before us. We must decide 
whether a federal court in New Jersey should, when 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Until quite recently the entire controversy doctrine required party as 
well as claim joinder. The party joinder aspect of the doctrine, the focus 
of the lion's share of the criticism, has now been eliminated. See N.J. R. 
Civ. Pro. 4:30A. However, the interjurisdictional claim preclusion 
problem, also the subject of considerable scholarly criticism, remains. 
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exercising its diversity jurisdiction, apply the entire 
controversy doctrine to bar the plaintiff from asserting 
claims against the defendants because they were not 
asserted in prior litigation involving the instant parties and 
others in federal courts in Pennsylvania, New York, and 
New Jersey. We conclude that we should not. Disagreeing 
with the District Court, which barred the plaintiff 's claim, 
we hold that federal courts should apply the general rule 
that the preclusive effect of a judgment is determined by 
the preclusion law of the issuing court--in this case, a 
federal court. We will, therefore, reverse the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the 
plaintiff 's tort claims and remand for further proceedings. 
We will also uphold the District Court's determination of 
the amount owed to defendant Agusta Aerospace 
Corporation ("AAC") on its counterclaims, but we will vacate 
the judgment on the counterclaims pending disposition of 
Paramount's tort claims. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
On October 10, 1989, an Agusta 109A helicopter crashed 
in New Jersey, killing the pilot, co-pilot, and three 
passengers, who were top-echelon employees of the Trump 
Hotel and Casino enterprises. The helicopter was 
manufactured by Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni 
Agusta ("CAGA") and purchased by AAC. CAGA is a 
subsidiary of Agusta S.p.A. and a part of Gruppo Agusta. 
AAC is CAGA's wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary. These are the 
"Agusta defendants." AAC sold the helicopter to Clifton Park 
Association, which sold it to FSQ Air Charter Corporation 
("FSQ"). Paramount Aviation, Inc. ("Paramount") arranged 
for this sale to FSQ and contracted with FSQ to manage the 
aircraft and to supply one of the two pilots who operated it. 
 
The first lawsuit arising from the crash was Kent v. 
Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta, Gruppo Agusta, 
Agusta Aviation Corp., & Paramount Aviation, Inc. ("Kent"), 
filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, on March 30, 1990, by the widow 
and estate of co-pilot Robert Kent. The Agusta defendants 
filed answers asserting cross-claims against Paramount for 
contribution and indemnification, and Paramount's answer 
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included cross-claims against the Agusta defendants for 
contribution and indemnification, but no affirmative claims. 
This case settled on November 27, 1990, for $3,150,000, of 
which the Agusta defendants paid $2,900,000 and 
Paramount paid $250,000. 
 
Second came Trump Taj Mahal Assoc., Trump Castle 
Assoc., Trump Plaza Assoc., & Helicopter Air Services, Inc. v. 
Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta, Agusta, Gruppo 
Agusta, Agusta Aviation Corp., & Paramount Aviation Corp. 
("Trump"), filed in 1990 in the Superior Court of New Jersey 
and immediately removed to federal court. Prior to serving 
answers, the defendants filed motions for summary 
judgment, and the district court dismissed all counts, 
ruling that the plaintiff-employers were not entitled to 
recover under any of the theories they had alleged. See 
Trump Taj Mahal Assoc. v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche 
Giovanni Agusta, S.p.A., 761 F. Supp. 1143 (D.N.J. 1991), 
aff 'd mem., 958 F.2d 365 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 
826 (1992). Paramount and the Agusta defendants asserted 
no cross-claims against each other, nor was there occasion 
for them to do so after the summary judgment motions 
were granted. 
 
Next came FSQ Air Charter Corp. v. Costruzioni 
Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta, Agusta, Gruppo Agusta, & 
Agusta Aviation Corp. ("FSQ"),filed in 1991 in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 
AAC filed a third-party complaint against Paramount, and 
Paramount answered without raising affirmative defenses 
or counterclaims. The parties' insurers defended the action, 
which was settled in June 1992 with an exchange of 
mutual releases that specifically excluded the claims in the 
case before us. 
 
Fourth was Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Gruppo Agusta, 
Agusta Aviation Corp., Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni 
Agusta, & Agusta S.p.A. ("PAC I"),filed in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey in 1990. That 
complaint alleged seven counts of tortious behavior, 
including negligence, willful misconduct, and strict tort 
liability. Paramount claimed that the crash caused it 
adverse publicity, public hostility, loss of clients and 
goodwill, loss of income, and other damages. On August 16, 
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1990, the complaint was voluntarily dismissed under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41, without prejudice, prior 
to answer. Kent was still pending at that point, and Trump 
was on appeal. 
 
Finally, PAC II, the instant case, was filed in New Jersey 
Superior Court in 1991. Alleging the same damages as PAC 
I, plaintiff Paramount stated two counts: (1) negligence, 
gross negligence, and willful and reckless misconduct; and 
(2) strict tort liability. Paramount claimed damages as a 
result of the Agusta defendants' manufacturing and design, 
which allegedly caused the crash. The case was removed, 
and the Agusta defendants (except for "Gruppo Agusta," 
which seems to be an umbrella name without independent 
corporate existence) filed answers in October 1992, while 
AAC also stated a counterclaim against Paramount for 
amounts allegedly owed for another Agusta helicopter and 
for payments for spare parts, service, and training. 
Although the complaint contained a certification about 
Trump and FSQ, as required by N.J. Rule 4:5-1, the Agusta 
defendants did not raise the entire controversy doctrine in 
their answers. The defendants first raised the entire 
controversy doctrine in February 1996 and filed a summary 
judgment motion on that ground in February 1997. 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment against 
Paramount on its claim, reasoning that the claim was 
barred by the entire controversy doctrine. It then granted 
summary judgment for AAC on the counterclaim. 
Paramount appeals. 
 
II. The Entire Controversy Doctrine 
 
A. Introduction; The District Court's Rationale 
 
Under the entire controversy doctrine, a party cannot 
withhold part of a controversy for separate later litigation 
even when the withheld component is a separate and 
independently cognizable cause of action. The doctrine has 
three purposes: (1) complete and final disposition of cases 
through avoidance of piecemeal decisions; (2) fairness to 
parties to an action and to others with a material interest 
in it; and (3) efficiency and avoidance of waste and delay. 
See DiTrolio v. Antiles, 662 A.2d 494, 502 (N.J. 1995). As an 
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equitable doctrine, its application is flexible, with a case-by- 
case appreciation for fairness to the parties. 
 
The entire controversy doctrine is an affirmative defense, 
waived if not pleaded or otherwise timely raised. See Brown 
v. Brown, 506 A.2d 29, 35 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986). 
Notwithstanding that principle, the District Court held that 
failure to raise the doctrine in a responsive pleading should 
be viewed in light of the federal policy of liberally allowing 
amendments if the issue was raised at a pragmatically 
sufficient time. See Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 
F.2d 1360, 1374 (3d Cir. 1993). Although the defendants 
had not formally raised the entire controversy defense until 
their motion for summary judgment, filed in 1997, the 
District Court decided that it would have granted leave to 
amend the pleadings to assert it. See id. at 1374; see also 
Burrell v. Quaranta, 612 A.2d 379 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1992) (entire controversy defense was not foreclosed where 
the trial judge would have granted leave to amend the 
pleading if asked). 
 
The District Court further determined that Paramount 
was not prejudiced by this decision. The court reasoned 
that, given the lengthy history of litigation over the crash, 
the application of the doctrine could not have been 
unforeseen. Moreover, the court concluded that the long 
delay between the filing of the complaint and the motion for 
summary judgment was not prejudicial because it was 
largely the result of Paramount's failure to prosecute the 
action vigorously.2 The court further found that the Kent 
litigation offered Paramount an opportunity to bring its 
claim against the Agusta defendants; Paramount had 
brought cross-claims for contribution and indemnification 
in that case. 
 
Paramount argued that the doctrine should not apply 
when all the previous actions, as well as the instant one, 
were federal, but the District Court reasoned that the 
doctrine had routinely been applied in federal court. See, 
e.g., Petrocelli v. Daniel Woodhead Co., 993 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The parties strenuously dispute the causes and effects of the delay, 
but, as we need not reach the issue, we will not address it in greater 
detail. 
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1993). Paramount maintained that the doctrine was 
procedural. The court responded that it was not 
"procedural" simply because it was codified in a rule of 
procedure; as a creature of state common law, the entire 
controversy doctrine was to be applied federally under the 
rule of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 
Paramount urges that the District Court abused its 
discretion in its application of the equitable considerations 
behind the entire controversy doctrine. The District Court, 
of course, has great discretion in matters of this sort. 
However, we need not reach the issue, because wefind that 
the entire controversy doctrine is not the right preclusion 
doctrine for a federal court to apply when prior judgments 
were not entered by the courts of New Jersey. 
 
B. Foreign Application of the Entire Controversy Doctrine 
 
In order to decide whether to apply New Jersey law or 
federal law, we must follow the rules laid down in Erie and 
its progeny. We are required to weigh the significance and 
substantive character of the state preclusion rule, and the 
likelihood that application of the federal rule would produce 
forum-shopping by parties, against the importance of the 
federal interests underlying the federal rule. See Byrd v. 
Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535-40 
(1958). If a rule is outcome-determinative, so that applying 
the federal rule would change the result of a casefiled in 
federal court from the result in an identical state court 
case, it is likely to affect parties' decisions where to litigate, 
and applying the state rule is generally appropriate. On the 
other side, a strong federal policy embodied in 
constitutional principles or federal law justifies the 
application of a federal rule. In this case, the relevant 
federal interests are embodied in Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 13, which establishes federal claim joinder rules, 
and in federal principles of res judicata. We conclude that 
New Jersey's interest in the entire controversy doctrine, 
while weighty, does not require us to adopt it in order to 
decide the preclusive effects of non-New Jersey cases. 
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       1. The Parties' Contentions 
 
Paramount notes that none of the lawsuits filed in the 
aftermath of the accident was litigated in New Jersey state 
court (three were brought in federal court and two were 
removed).3 It argues that the New Jersey Rules of Court 
containing the entire controversy doctrine are procedural 
and therefore should not be applied in federal court. 
Paramount also submits that New Jersey's interest in 
preserving the resources of its courts is minimal, if not 
absent, here, where all of the prior cases were litigated 
outside of the New Jersey courts. See Henkels & McCoy, 
Inc. v. Adochio, 906 F. Supp. 244, 249 (E.D. Pa. 1995) 
(declining to apply the doctrine where both the previous 
case and the instant case were in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania). 
 
Paramount further contends that, when a prior decision's 
preclusive effect is examined, it is the prior jurisdiction's 
preclusion law that should generally be applied. See 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 87 (1982). Paramount 
reasons that federal preclusion law should apply to 
determine the preclusive effects of federal diversity 
judgments. In the absence of a prior New Jersey judgment 
on the merits, Paramount maintains, we have no reason to 
apply New Jersey's supercharged preclusion doctrine. 
 
The defendants respond that the Full Faith and Credit 
Act, 28 U.S.C. S 1738 (1994), requires a federal court 
hearing a New Jersey tort claim to be bound by New Jersey 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Paramount submits, and the Agusta defendants do not challenge, that 
the fact that actions were originally commenced in state court is 
irrelevant. Once removed, jurisdiction in the District Court is original 
and federal procedure applies. Moreover, the state courts have expended 
negligible resources on the removed case; New Jersey courts do not 
apply the doctrine when a prior case was pending for only a few days 
and no notable activity took place. Cf. Hulmes v. Honda Motor Co., 924 
F. Supp. 673 (D.N.J. 1996) (declining to apply the doctrine when the first 
action was only pending in New Jersey state court for one week before 
its voluntary dismissal); Karpovich v. Barbarula, 696 A.2d 659 (N.J. 
1997) (holding that a settlement did not require application of the 
doctrine where there were only seven days between the state court filing 
and the entry of a consent judgment and virtually no judicial resources 
were used). 
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substantive law, of which the entire controversy doctrine is 
a part. See Rycoline Prods., Inc. v. C&W Unltd., 109 F.3d 
883, 887 (3d Cir. 1997). We note some initial discomfort 
with this description, as we believe that the entire 
controversy doctrine, like all preclusion doctrine, should 
generally be characterized as procedural. We take up 
Rycoline and the substance/procedure divide infra, noting 
here only that the Supreme Court has long instructed us 
that the substance/procedure line is not dispositive when 
federal courts must choose which sovereign's law to apply. 
See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
 
The defendants also point out that federal courts have 
occasionally applied the entire controversy doctrine to 
determine the effects of non-New Jersey judgments, but the 
parties in prior decisions have not contested the application 
of the doctrine.4 Nor have we resolved the broader issue of 
whether federal or state res judicata law governs successive 
diversity actions. See Venuto v. Witco Corp., 117 F.3d 754, 
758 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1997). We have, however, decided that 
federal law governs the preclusive effect of a prior diversity 
judgment on a subsequent federal question case. See In re 
Kaplan, 143 F.3d 807, 814-15 (3d Cir. 1998). We noted in 
Kaplan that the Supreme Court used federal law to 
determine the preclusive effect of a prior diversity judgment 
in Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726 (1946). Though the 
issue was not then before us, we also suggested that the 
rationale for applying federal preclusion law to determine 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The entire controversy doctrine has indeed been invoked when the 
previous suit was in another state or in a federal court. Melikian v. 
Corradetti, 791 F.2d 274 (3d Cir. 1986), applied the entire controversy 
doctrine, though its only preclusive effect was on a corporation that may 
not even have been a party to the second lawsuit. See id. at 280 & n.3. 
Melikian assumed that the doctrine applied to successive diversity cases 
in New Jersey and did not address the choice of law question. Thus, it 
does not control our decision today. Similarly, in Itzkoff v. F&G Realty, 
Corp., 890 F. Supp. 351 (D.N.J. 1995), the first action was in New York 
state court and the second in New Jersey federal court. The parties and 
the court assumed that the entire controversy doctrine governed. See 
Itzkoff, 890 F. Supp. at 355. The court found that New Jersey (state) 
courts would apply the doctrine to foreign proceedings "where fairness so 
required." Id. at 356. The parties did not broach the specific issue of a 
federal court's application of the doctrine. 
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the effects of a prior diversity judgment on a later federal 
question case was quite similar to the rationale for doing so 
in a later diversity case. See Kaplan, 143 F.3d at 815 n.15. 
 
       2. Relevant Case Law 
 
We find two New Jersey decisions particularly helpful in 
elucidating New Jersey's view of the entire controversy 
doctrine. In Watkins v. Resorts International Hotel & Casino, 
Inc., 591 A.2d 592 (N.J. 1991), the New Jersey Supreme 
Court acknowledged the general rule that the preclusive 
effect of a judgment is determined by the law of the 
jurisdiction that rendered it, as a logical consequence of the 
procedures of the issuing court. See id. at 598. This rule 
affects the application of the entire controversy doctrine in 
New Jersey state court. Only in "limited circumstances" 
may the doctrine preclude an action not otherwise 
precluded by the res judicata effects of a federal decision. 
See id. at 598-99. The court held that it was essential to 
consider the federal law of claim preclusion in determining 
whether to apply the entire controversy doctrine, as an 
equitable matter, in state court cases. See id. at 599. 
Watkins thus suggests that New Jersey recognizes the 
interests of other jurisdictions that have differing preclusion 
doctrines. 
 
In Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. 
Co., 662 A.2d 536 (N.J. 1995), the New Jersey Supreme 
Court applied the entire controversy doctrine to a plaintiff 
who had previously sued on the same underlying facts in 
the federal District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. Almost a year earlier, a mortgage lender had 
brought an action in the latter court against Pennsylvania- 
based companies and individuals who were allegedly the 
central figures in a fraudulent scheme involving mortgage 
financing, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation ("Fannie Mae") had intervened as a plaintiff. 
The second case was brought in New Jersey state court by 
the lender and Fannie Mae against New Jersey-based 
companies and individuals who participated in the same 
mortgage transactions and who were allegedly accessories 
in the same scheme. 
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Mortgagelinq stated decisively that the entire controversy 
doctrine is procedural, and that it was formulated 
specifically to preserve the resources of New Jersey courts.5 
The Court held that the doctrine bars suits in New Jersey 
against parties who could have been joined in an earlier 
suit in another state or in federal court. The result was 
binding only in New Jersey, however; other jurisdictions 
could permit litigation against earlier-omitted defendants 
despite a New Jersey decision dismissing an action on 
entire controversy grounds. The decision thus attempted to 
cabin the effect of the doctrine outside of New Jersey 
courts: 
 
       We hold that when a party deliberately chooses to 
       fragment litigation by suing certain parties in another 
       jurisdiction and withholds claims against other parties, 
       a New Jersey court need not later entertain the claims 
       against the omitted parties if jurisdiction was available 
       in the first forum. In doing so we do not export our 
       entire controversy doctrine to other jurisdictions, but 
       merely hold that our notions of procedural fairness do 
       not permit the claims that could have been brought 
       elsewhere to be brought in New Jersey. This ruling 
       presupposes that when the procedural rules of foreign 
       jurisdictions permit the omitted claims to be brought 
       later, the foreign jurisdiction is free to entertain such 
       claims. Just as we do not seek to export our 
       procedural requirements of party joinder, we do not 
       seek to export any preclusive effect to our rules of 
       party joinder. 
 
        . . . . 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Guaranty Trust Co. announced that"[i]t is . . . immaterial whether 
statutes of limitation are characterized either as`substantive' or 
`procedural' in State court opinions in any use of those terms unrelated 
to the specific [Erie] issue before us." Guaranty Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 
109. Mortgagelinq, however, is intimately related to the choice of law 
issue, and thus we do not believe that Justice Frankfurter's conclusion 
precludes us from considering that case. More importantly, we believe 
that Watkins and Mortgagelinq provide insight into the scope of New 
Jersey's interest in its doctrine, an issue that is distinct from the 
doctrine's location on the substance/procedure line. 
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        One of the underpinnings of the entire controversy 
       doctrine, in addition to fairness to the parties, is 
       fairness to the system of judicial administration. 
       "Judicial economy and efficiency--the avoidance of 
       waste and delay--remain constants in the application 
       of the entire controversy doctrine. Fragmented and 
       multiple litigation takes its toll on not only the parties 
       but the judicial institution and the public." Each 
       jurisdiction is free to assess the importance of such 
       values. . . . 
 
        If Pennsylvania courts do not have a comparable 
       party-joinder rule, principles of comity suggest that 
       New Jersey should not seek to export its entire 
       controversy doctrine to regulate the conduct of 
       attorneys in that jurisdiction. In other words, attorneys 
       conducting litigation in Pennsylvania courts should not 
       have to accommodate their practices to the demands of 
       New Jersey courts. A corollary of that proposition, 
       however, is that New Jersey courts need not 
       necessarily grant relief when parties deliberately refrain 
       from seeking relief in other jurisdictions when doing so 
       would have been much fairer to all parties involved. 
       There is a delicate balance between the interests of the 
       two jurisdictions that must accommodate the interests 
       of justice. . . . 
 
        . . . . 
 
        Maintaining a cohesive federal system (and the Full 
       Faith and Credit Clause melds the state courts into 
       that system) does not require that the other parts of 
       the federal system honor our entire controversy 
       doctrine. 
 
Mortgagelinq, 662 A.2d at 537, 540, 541, 542 (citations 
omitted). 
 
The Mortgagelinq court mentioned that "the federal courts 
are considered those of another sovereign," id. at 541, and 
suggested that the application of the doctrine in a diversity 
action in New Jersey federal court might be governed by 
choice of law principles, indicating that the court did not 
necessarily expect federal courts in New Jersey to apply the 
doctrine exactly as the state courts would. See id. at 542. 
 
                                12 
  
Thus, while Mortgagelinq continued to embrace an 
expansive view of the doctrine within New Jersey state 
courts, it heralded an awareness of the doctrine's limits 
when interjurisdictional problems were involved. While New 
Jersey cannot, of course, control our understanding of the 
relevant federal law, we consider Watkins and Mortgagelinq 
useful explications of the justifications for the doctrine, and 
hence of New Jersey's interests. We turn, therefore, to an 
assesment of the relevant state and federal interests. 
 
       3. Analysis of the Relevant State and Federal Interests 
 
        a. The Import of Rycoline 
 
Rycoline held that a federal court deciding a federal cause 
of action is bound by the entire controversy doctrine when 
determining the effect of a prior New Jersey state court 
judgment. The court characterized the doctrine as "an 
aspect of the substantive law of New Jersey, by virtue of the 
Full Faith and Credit Act." Rycoline, 109 F.3d at 887. Thus, 
the plaintiffs, who had filed a previous suit in New Jersey 
state court, were subject to the rigors of the entire 
controversy doctrine when they filed a second suit in New 
Jersey federal court, although they were able to proceed 
because we decided that New Jersey would not apply the 
doctrine while the first suit was still pending. 
 
The defendants claim that the just-quoted phrase from 
Rycoline obligates us to apply the entire controversy 
doctrine as part of New Jersey substantive law under Erie. 
We believe that the question is slightly more complex. The 
Full Faith and Credit Act provides that the judicial 
proceedings of a state court shall have the same full faith 
and credit within every court in the United States as they 
have by law or usage in the courts of the issuing state. 
Thus, federal courts must give the same preclusive effect to 
a state court judgment as another court of that state 
would, unless to do so would violate due process. See 
Rycoline, 109 F.3d at 887. In this case, there are only 
federal judgments, and the Full Faith and Credit Act is not 
by its terms applicable. It is usually thought that federal 
judgments receive full faith and credit by virtue of federal 
common law. See, e.g., Ronan Degnan, Federalized Res 
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Judicata, 85 Yale L.J. 741, 744-50 (1976) (discussing the 
development of the rule requiring respect for federal 
judgments); cf. Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 10 (1883) 
("[T]he judgments of the courts of the United States have 
invariably been recognized as upon the same footing, so far 
as concerns the obligation created by them, with domestic 
judgments of the states, wherever rendered and whereever 
[sic] sought to be enforced."). 
 
To the extent that Rycoline labelled the entire controversy 
doctrine "substantive" for purposes of the Full Faith and 
Credit Act, we conclude that it meant only that New Jersey 
law governed the preclusive effects of an earlier New Jersey 
state court judgment. This is exactly what the Act requires. 
See University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 794 
(1986). We decline to read one phrase in a decision that 
depended on completely different issues as determining the 
result in this case. Rather, our interpretation of Rycoline 
renders it consistent with the long line of New Jersey cases 
labelling the entire controversy doctrine "procedural." See, 
e.g., Oliver v. Ambrose, 705 A.2d 742, 746 (N.J. 1998); 
Harley Davidson Motor Co. v. Advance Die Casting, Inc., 696 
A.2d 666, 668 (N.J. 1997); Mortgagelinq; Woodward-Clyde 
Consultants v. Chemical & Pollution Sciences, Inc. , 
523 A.2d 131, 135 (N.J. 1987). At all events, the 
substance/procedure divide is not necessarily the 
controlling factor in determining when a federal court must 
apply state law. See Guaranty Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 109- 
10. 
 
Under Mortgagelinq, a dismissal on entire controversy 
grounds is not a dismissal on the merits; this rule helps to 
ensure that the doctrine will not have untoward 
extraterritorial effects.6 However, New Jersey law still 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The characterization of an entire controversy-based dismissal as one 
not on the merits only matters when the prior decision to which New 
Jersey applies the doctrine is not handed down by a New Jersey state 
court. When the first decision issues from a New Jersey court, that case 
carries its own preclusive effect, deserving of full respect in the courts 
of 
other jurisdictions. If there is a second New Jersey case that is 
dismissed 
on entire controversy grounds, and then a third federal case, we might 
also give the second New Jersey case preclusive effect on the issue of the 
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determines the preclusive effects of a prior New Jersey state 
court judgment on the merits, as in Rycoline. 
 
        b. New Jersey's Interests and the Risks of Forum- 
        Shopping 
 
New Jersey's main justification for the doctrine, its 
interest in preserving its judicial resources, is minimized 
when none of the prior litigation took place in New Jersey 
state courts. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Linda J. 
Silberman, Interjurisdictional Implications of the Entire 
Controversy Doctrine, 28 Rutgers L.J. 123, 156 (1996). New 
Jersey state courts still apply the doctrine in such cases, 
which conserves some of New Jersey's judicial resources by 
precluding subsequent litigation in New Jersey. By 
contrast, when both prior and subsequent litigation takes 
place outside the New Jersey state courts, it is hard to see 
any New Jersey resource interest whatsoever, except 
inasmuch as the size of the federal docket indirectly affects 
the state courts. 
 
The risk of unfair surprise is also heightened where the 
initial litigation did not take place in New Jersey; it may be 
difficult for responsible lawyers to predict that litigation in 
New York or California will close the New Jersey federal 
courts to future claims. See id. at 169; cf. Electro-Miniatures 
Corp. v. Wendon Co., 889 F.2d 41, 45 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(expressing the concern that, if the entire controversy 
doctrine were applied to out-of-state judgments in New 
Jersey federal court, other jurisdictions would be adversely 
affected by the need to tailor litigation to avoid preclusion 
in New Jersey). But see Perry Dane, Dignity and Glorious 
Chaos: A Comment on the Interjurisdictional Implications of 
the Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28 Rutgers L.J. 173 (1996) 
(arguing that the problems with the doctrine are 
overstated). Given New Jersey's recognition, in Watkins and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
application of the entire controversy doctrine to the facts, see 18 Wright 
et al., Federal Practice & Procedure S 4418, at 171 (1981) (discussing the 
preclusive effects of determinations that do not go to the merits), but we 
need not delve further into these murky preclusion waters to decide the 
case before us. 
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Mortgagelinq, that other jurisdictions have significantly 
different preclusion doctrines and a strong interest in giving 
effect to those doctrines, we do not believe that a decision 
requiring federal courts to apply federal preclusion law 
would depreciate New Jersey law. 
 
Some commentators have argued that Mortgagelinq was 
wrongly decided and that the Full Faith and Credit Act does 
not give New Jersey the freedom to give other courts' 
decisions greater preclusive effect than those courts would 
allow. See Stephen B. Burbank, Where's the Beef? The 
Interjurisdictional Effects of New Jersey's Entire Controversy 
Doctrine, 28 Rutgers L.J. 87 (1996). Professor Burbank 
argues that Mortgagelinq works against the compelling 
interest in national unity by requiring litigants in other 
states to consider the preclusive effects of their cases on 
future cases in New Jersey, regardless of the preclusion law 
of the state in which they file complaints. He concludes 
that, regardless of New Jersey state court practice, federal 
courts in New Jersey should apply standard preclusion law, 
rather than the entire controversy doctrine, to the 
judgments of non-New Jersey courts. See Burbank, supra, 
at 100-01; see also Dreyfuss & Silberman, supra, at 157- 
58. 
 
Professor Burbank further argues that, when a federal 
court in New Jersey tries to resolve this conundrum, it 
should apply the Full Faith and Credit Act rather than Erie 
balancing. Judicial balancing would be unnecessary, 
because Congress has explicitly instructed courts how to 
treat the judgments of state courts. See Burbank, supra, at 
103 n.82. Thus, if the previous litigation involved in this 
case had taken place in a state court, we would, as a 
matter of course, give it the preclusive effect it would have 
in that state's courts. 
 
Though we find this argument persuasive, it does not 
dispose of this case, because the Full Faith and Credit Act 
does not by its terms apply here. When the prior decision 
is a federal decision, the Act applies only by analogy. And 
in that case, it is important to look to Erie principles to 
decide which sovereign's law to apply. The Full Faith and 
Credit Act has an important implication, however: If the Act 
instructs New Jersey federal courts how to determine the 
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preclusive effect of state decisions, there is a compelling 
argument for treating federal cases similarly. There is no 
good reason to apply New Jersey entire controversy law to 
determine the preclusive effects of a federal diversity case 
from Pennsylvania when the preclusive effects of the same 
case would have been governed by the law of the issuing 
court if it had been litigated in Pennsylvania state court. To 
make different rules for the two types of cases would be 
absurd, and would only move the potential forum-shopping 
problem back one level further, to the initial non-New 
Jersey litigation. 
 
We note another factor that diminishes the force of the 
Erie concerns that generally lead to application of state law. 
Our Erie jurisprudence counsels us to avoid situations in 
which parties who can invoke federal jurisdiction are 
treated differently from those who cannot. Because we are 
considering a preclusion doctrine, the question is whether 
parties who can invoke federal jurisdiction will be able to 
litigate claims that will be precluded for parties who cannot. 
The risk of inequitable preclusion is minimal, for the 
following reason: This situation arises only when there has 
been previous litigation outside the New Jersey state 
courts. However, the entire controversy doctrine would only 
bar a subsequent New Jersey suit if the first forum would 
have had jurisdiction over the claims raised in that 
subsequent suit. It therefore follows that there was an 
alternate non-New Jersey forum for the relevant claims, 
although in some cases that forum would be another state 
court. The relevant point is that no plaintiff in this situation 
will find itself entirely unable to litigate its claims; even if it 
is not able to take advantage of federal jurisdiction, it will 
have another state in which to bring its claims.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. It is possible, of course, that a party who has already participated in 
a foreign lawsuit will mistakenly file a second suit in New Jersey state 
court and will lose on entire controversy grounds after the statute of 
limitations for filing a claim elsewhere has run, although it is not 
entirely 
clear that a plaintiff in such a situation would be subject to the 
doctrine. 
See Erenberg v. Cordero, 683 A.2d 567, 574 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 
1996) (Stern, J., concurring) (stating that the doctrine should only be 
applied to the judgments of foreign courts if the plaintiff 's claim is 
actually capable of being litigated in some non-New Jersey court). After 
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Any resulting disparity is no more than the disparity 
created by the very existence of diversity jurisdiction, which 
allows some parties the option of going to federal court 
whereas others with identical causes of action cannot.8 
While a decision to apply federal preclusion law would be 
outcome-determinative in this case, therefore, it would not 
ex ante cut off or extend any substantive rights that a 
plaintiff would have in the absence of a New Jersey federal 
forum, and would be unlikely to encourage significant 
forum-shopping.9 
 
Our analysis can be summarized as follows: New Jersey 
has no significant interest in controlling the dockets of 
other court systems. Moreover, application of a federal rule 
in the rather unusual circumstances here would be 
unlikely to create unfairness by causing different results in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
our decision, a plaintiff who files in New Jersey federal court will not 
be 
"mistaken," and will not face this dilemma. Thus, there is a possibility 
that results will differ in some cases. However, Erie rules were designed 
to avoid conscious forum-shopping, not to increase the risks of 
carelessness or unfamiliarity with state law. 
 
8. The decision to apply federal preclusion law affects forum choice in 
this sense only: A well-informed plaintiff might be able to split claims 
between some foreign court and a New Jersey federal court that, if the 
federal court applied the entire controversy doctrine, it would otherwise 
consolidate in the foreign court. But this is not the forum-shopping 
between state and federal court that Erie decried; it is claim-splitting, 
which presents different issues. As long as the plaintiff adheres to the 
other jurisdictions' rules of joinder, we do not think that any inequity 
has occurred. It is theoretically possible that variations between New 
Jersey choice-of-law doctrines and the choice-of-law doctrines of other 
jurisdictions might change the outcome on such a split claim, but we 
doubt that parties will base their forum choices on such exotic 
possibilities. 
 
9. Relatedly, the forum-shopping concern is diminished simply because 
successive litigation is less common than litigation in the first 
instance; 
there are many factors that go into a decision tofile a second lawsuit, 
and we doubt that a decision to apply federal preclusion law will 
substantially alter the relevant incentives. In this case, Paramount was 
not even the initial plaintiff in the pre-PAC lawsuits; in a real sense, 
Paramount had very little choice over those fora, even though it filed 
counterclaims and cross-claims. 
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federal court than in state court or to cause significant 
forum-shopping. The issues of outcome-determinativeness 
and a consequent incentive to forum-shop are not free from 
doubt, however. Therefore, it is important for us to 
determine whether there is a significant federal interest 
counseling application of the federal rule. See Fauber v. 
KEM Transp. & Equip. Co., 876 F.2d 327, 331 (3d Cir. 
1989). It is to this question that we now turn. 
 
        c. The Federal Interest 
 
Federal courts have a significant interest in determining 
the preclusive effects of federal judgments. See Kaplan, 143 
F.3d at 815 n.15 (citing cases). Kaplan applied federal law 
to determine the preclusive effects of a diversity judgment 
on a subsequent federal question case. We believe that its 
logic is equally applicable here, when successive diversity 
cases are at issue. The source of federal jurisdiction over 
the second case should not affect our analysis, because we 
are concerned with the preclusive effect of the first. As the 
Second Circuit has put it: 
 
       One of the strongest policies a court can have is that 
       of determining the scope of its own judgments. . . . It 
       would be destructive of the basic principles of the 
       Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to say that the effect 
       of a judgment of a federal court was governed by the 
       law of the state where the court sits simply because 
       the source of federal jurisdiction is diversity. 
 
Kern v. Hettinger, 303 F.2d 333, 340 (2d Cir. 1962). We 
agree. 
 
Paramount persuasively argues that we should apply the 
general federal rule that the preclusive effects of prior cases 
are determined by the law of the prior forum. Applying the 
federal rule would also give effect to the joinder rules of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which define the claims 
that parties must join if they are not to be later barred. Cf. 
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (the strong federal 
policies embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
justify a refusal to apply an outcome-determinative state 
procedural rule); Byrd (outcome-determinative state 
procedural rules do not need to be applied when they are 
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not an integral part of the underlying substantive right and 
there is a strong countervailing federal policy, such as the 
policy against disrupting the allocation of power between 
judge and jury in federal court). Paramount draws further 
support from the scholarly opinion in Fioriglio v. City of 
Atlantic City, 963 F. Supp. 415 (D.N.J. 1997), which 
engaged in a calculus similar to ours; Judge Irenas 
concluded, as we do, that federal joinder and preclusion 
rules embody an important federal policy that weighs 
heavily against applying the entire controversy doctrine in 
these circumstances. See id. at 424. 
 
        d. Summary and Conclusion 
 
We conclude that respecting courts' power to determine 
the preclusive effects of their own rulings is a significant 
federal interest. In particular, the claim joinder provisions 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure express a federal 
policy about what claims must be joined to avoid later 
preclusion. Applying New Jersey preclusion law to 
determine the preclusive effects of federal cases would 
frustrate the policy embodied in the Rules, and we decline 
to do so. Instead we will follow the federal rule that the law 
of the issuing court--here, federal law--determines the 
preclusive effects of a prior judgment.10  
 
In reaching this result, clearly foreshadowed by Kaplan, 
we follow the majority of circuits to confront the issue of 
the law to be applied in successive diversity cases. See, e.g., 
J.Z.G. Resources, Inc. v. Shelby Ins. Co., 84 F.3d 211, 213- 
14 (6th Cir. 1996); Havoco, Ltd. v. Freeman, Atkins & 
Coleman, Ltd., 58 F.3d 303, 307-08 (7th Cir. 1995); 
Johnson v. SCA Disposal Servs., 931 F.2d 970, 974 (1st Cir. 
1991); Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. J. Transport, Inc., 
880 F.2d 1291, 1293 n.2 (11th Cir. 1989); Shoup v. Bell & 
Howell Co., 872 F.2d 1178, 1179 (4th Cir. 1989); Aerojet- 
General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 715-18 (5th Cir. 
1975); Kern, 303 F.2d at 340 (Second Circuit). But see 
Follette v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 41 F.3d 1234, 1237 (8th 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We need not resolve here whether particular aspects of preclusion, 
such as privity, are "substantive" and are governed by state law. Cf. 
Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 962 n.2 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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Cir. 1994) (applying state law); Pardo v. Olson & Sons, Inc., 
40 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 1994) (same). 
 
Since we have decided that federal law, rather than the 
entire controversy doctrine, applies, the obvious question 
is: What is the federal law? However, the Agusta defendants 
have not argued, either in the District Court or this court, 
that federal preclusion principles bar Paramount's suit. We 
thus deem a possible res judicata argument waived. See 
Security Servs., Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 996 F.2d 1516, 1519 
(3d Cir. 1993); Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of 
Carpenters & Joiners, 927 F.2d 1283, 1298 (3d Cir. 1991).11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We doubt that such a claim would be meritorious in any event. The 
preclusion inquiry in this case is essentially identical to the question 
whether Paramount's tort claims were compulsory in any of the earlier 
lawsuits. See Publicis Communication v. True North Communications Inc., 
132 F.3d 363, 365 (7th Cir. 1997). There is no compulsory cross-claim 
rule in the federal system, see Wolfe v. Safecard Servs., 873 F. Supp. 
648, 649 (S.D. Fla. 1995), and therefore the Trump suit clearly does not 
preclude this suit. 
 
The Kent suit raises a somewhat trickier issue, because Paramount 
and the Agusta defendants filed cross-claims for contribution and 
indemnification against one another in that case. Arguably, the filing of 
a cross-claim makes parties "opposing parties" within the meaning of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13. See Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R. 
Co., 438 F.2d 62, 66 (3d Cir. 1971) (dicta). A conversion into "opposing 
party" status would imply that, although cross-claims are never 
compulsory in themselves, the filing of one cross-claim would trigger 
duties on both sides to file all claims that were compulsory under Rule 
13(a). However, we suspect that a compulsory cross-claim rule would be 
limited to situations in which the initial cross-claim included a 
substantive claim, as opposed to claims for contribution and indemnity, 
in order to avoid needless complication of litigation. See Hall v. General 
Motors Corp., 647 F.2d 175, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Rainbow Mgmt. Group, 
Ltd. v. Atlantis Submarines Hawai'i, L.P., 158 F.R.D. 656, 660 (D. Haw. 
1994) (cited in 6 Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure S 1404, at 2 
(Supp. 1997), for the proposition that filing one cross-claim turns 
coparties into opposing parties). But see Kane v. Magna Mixer Co., 71 
F.3d 555, 562 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that indemnity claims trigger the 
compulsory cross-claim rule). Thus, the cross-claims for contribution 
and indemnity in Kent would not likely bar the present litigation. 
 
FSQ, in which AAC filed a third-party complaint against Paramount, 
raises the specter of an omitted compulsory counterclaim that would 
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We will therefore vacate the judgment in favor of the 
defendants and remand to the District Court for further 
proceedings on Paramount's tort claims. 
 
III. The Counterclaims 
 
In its counterclaims, AAC alleged that it was entitled to 
payments for the lease of one helicopter and for goods and 
services provided for three other helicopters. It presented 
three counterclaims, but the third counterclaim in actuality 
duplicated the claims of the first two, and the District Court 
granted summary judgment on those two. In order to 
prevail on summary judgment, a party stating an 
affirmative claim must come forward with evidence entitling 
it to a directed verdict. See International Shortstop, Inc. v. 
Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 
The first counterclaim was for $34,629 plus 1.5% interest 
per month for breach of a helicopter lease contract entered 
into on March 20, 1987, and expiring November 15, 1989. 
The second was for $28,159.98 plus 1.5% interest per 
month for breach of a contract for the sale and supply of 
spare parts, services, and training related to three of 
Paramount's helicopters. The third was for an account 
stated between AAC and Paramount for $62,788.98 for 
unpaid lease payments and goods, services, and training, 
plus 1.5% interest per month after September 1989. The 
contracts were governed by Pennsylvania law. 
 
AAC proffered the relevant lease agreements and invoices, 
and an affidavit from its Vice President of Finance and 
Administration, Vincent Genovese, detailing the amounts 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
preclude the present suit. However, we are inclined to think that the 
releases in FSQ, which specifically excluded the PAC claims, would 
operate as a waiver of a preclusion defense. See Publicis, 132 F.3d at 
366; cf. Bristol Farmers Market & Auction Co. v. Arlen Realty & Devel. 
Corp., 589 F.2d 1214, 1220-21 (3d Cir. 1978) (parties are not precluded 
from arbitrating claims that would normally be precluded by the 
compulsory counterclaim rule if they have agreed to arbitrate those 
claims); Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 26(1)(a) (providing that 
parties may agree "in terms or in effect" that a plaintiff may split a 
claim). 
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not paid and calculating the interest due thereunder. For 
its account stated claim, AAC submitted a November 14, 
1991, letter from Genovese to Al Bartone, Paramount's 
president. The letter states: 
 
       This letter shall formalize our agreement in which you 
       have agreed to make monthly payments of $3,000 
       commencing 1/1/1992 in order to satisfy the debts 
       owed by Paramount to Agusta Aerospace. As of October 
       31, 1991, the outstanding balance was $88,829.02 
       which includes interest of $10,361.00. Interest will 
       continue to accrue on the principal amount of the debt 
       until it is paid in full. 
 
        Please indicate your agreement with these terms by 
       signing below. 
 
Bartone signed "Agreed" on November 14, 1991. Paramount 
states that, in addition to this letter, it entered into a 
"short-term lease agreement" with AAC on the same day. 
This agreement gave Paramount the right to lease a newer 
model 109 helicopter from AAC for an hourly rental fee, and 
Paramount agreed to attempt to sell this aircraft on 
commission. Paramount contends that this new lease 
agreement was part of a package deal that also included 
the agreement relating to past debts quoted above. 
However, Paramount does not challenge AAC's basic 
underlying evidence regarding the existence and terms of 
the 1987 helicopter lease and the service contract. 
 
Paramount defended against the account stated claim by 
noting that, although the November 14 Genovese/Bartone 
letter was signed two days after AAC filed counterclaims, 
the amount in the letter differs from that in the 
counterclaim, and the letter makes no mention of those 
counterclaims. Paramount also argued that AAC did not 
submit proof that it demanded payment before filing the 
counterclaims. The District Court found Paramount's 
arguments persuasive to defeat the account stated claim, 
but ultimately irrelevant, because the relief sought on the 
account stated claim was exactly the same relief sought on 
the two breach of contract claims, on which it granted 
summary judgment to AAC. We agree. 
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In fact, Paramount did not effectively challenge AAC's 
entitlement to the amounts asserted in the counterclaims, 
except to offer a number of defenses: an argument that the 
November 14 letter constituted an accord and satisfaction 
or a novation; a claim that AAC had waived its 
counterclaims; and various equitable defenses. It also 
asserted a set-off. The District Court rejected these 
defenses. We take them up in turn, except for the equitable 
defenses, which we dispose of summarily in the margin.12 
 
A. Accord and Satisfaction or Novation 
 
Paramount contends that there was an accord and 
satisfaction or a novation, based on the November 14 letter. 
An accord and satisfaction is a substitute contract for 
settlement of a debt by some alternative other than full 
payment. See Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Environmental 
Liners, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1994). The 
consideration is the resolution of a disputed claim. The 
District Court found that the November 14 letter might be 
evidence of an accord, but that there was no evidence that 
Paramount had made payment according to the agreement, 
which is required for satisfaction. See Beechwood Commons 
Condominium Ass'n v. Beechwood Commons Assocs., Ltd., 
580 A.2d 1, 5 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). We agree. When an 
accord is breached, the non-defaulting party can enforce, at 
its option, the underlying agreement or the accord. See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Paramount asserted a hodgepodge of equitable defenses, which the 
court held inapplicable to AAC's counterclaims. Estoppel, for example, 
requires material misrepresentation, reasonable reliance, and resulting 
damage. See Greenberg v. Tomlin, 816 F. Supp. 1039, 1055 (E.D. Pa. 
1993). The District Court found no evidence of misrepresentation. As for 
unclean hands, that defense applies when the party seeking relief is 
guilty of fraud, unconscionable conduct, or bad faith directly related to 
the matter at issue that injures the other party and affects the balance 
of equities. See Equibank v. Adle, Inc., 595 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1991). However, Paramount does not allege that the invoices that are 
the subject of the counterclaim deal with services that were negligently 
provided, nor would a vibration problem in one helicopter be enough to 
establish the defense. Furthermore, the court found no evidence of 
unconscionability or that the contract was against public policy. The 
equitable defenses are essentially conclusory and we think that the 
District Court was correct to reject them. 
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Nowicki Constr. Co. v. Panar Corp., 492 A.2d 36, 40 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1985). Thus, without any evidence of satisfaction 
(and there was none), there was not a scintilla of evidence 
supporting this defense. We find no error in the District 
Court's reasoning on this point. 
 
Paramount then argued that the letter was a novation, 
extinguishing the former obligation by another new 
promise. In a novation, the new promise itself satisfies the 
preexisting claims, whereas in an accord it is the 
performance of the new promise that does so. See id. A 
novation bars revival of the preexisting duty. See 
Beechwood, 580 A.2d at 5. The essential difference between 
an accord and a novation is the parties' intent. See Nowicki, 
492 A.2d at 40. The party asserting a novation has the 
burden of proof. See Buttonwood Farms, Inc. v. Carson, 478 
A.2d 484, 486 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). The District Court 
found that there was no evidence of any kind that the 
parties intended to extinguish their obligations under the 
original lease and contract. 
 
Paramount claims that a jury could find the letter to be 
a novation, especially when viewed in context with the lease 
agreement for the new model 109A helicopter executed the 
same day and given that the amount in the letter differed 
from that stated in the counterclaim. The existence of a 
substituted contract is generally for the jury. See Proie 
Bros., Inc. v. Proie, 301 F. Supp. 680, 682 (W.D. Pa. 1968), 
aff'd, 414 F.2d 1365 (3d Cir. 1969). However, we do not 
think that a reasonable jury could find that the November 
14 lease agreement or the counterclaim evidence an intent 
to enter into a novation. There is simply no suggestion in 
the record that either of the parties considered the 
November 14 letter to be a new contract. On its face it is no 
more than an agreement to pay amounts owed on a certain 
schedule, and Paramount has offered no other evidence of 
the parties' intent.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. If there was a new contract, Paramount further argues, the statute 
of limitations has run on it, because the counterclaim was never 
amended to include the new contract. Because we conclude that there 
was no new contract, we need not resolve this issue. 
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B. Waiver 
 
Paramount also argues that AAC waived its claim by 
failing to send dunning notices or to take any steps to 
collect the debts that were due and owing until Paramount 
sued. Under Pennsylvania law, waiver of legal rights can 
arise by clear, unequivocal, and decisive action by a party 
with knowledge of such rights and evident purpose to 
surrender them. Waiver can be express or implied from 
conduct in situations that would support equitable 
estoppel. The party claiming implied waiver must show that 
it was misled and prejudiced by the other party's conduct. 
See Prousi v. Cruisers Div. of KCS Int'l, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 
768, 771-72 (E.D. Pa. 1997). Under these requirements, the 
court held, Paramount could not prove waiver. Even 
assuming that AAC made no attempt to collect on its debts 
until sued, Paramount was neither misled nor prejudiced. 
Moreover, failure to demand payment is simply not a clear, 
unequivocal, and decisive action. As long as the claim was 
asserted within the statute of limitations, as it was, 
Paramount had no reasonable expectation that it would be 
free from the counterclaim. 
 
C. Disputes as to Amount 
 
Paramount also makes several claims about the amount 
due. First, it argues that the award of 1.5% interest on the 
goods and services contract was inappropriate, because 
only the helicopter lease agreement provided for interest, 
and because many of the invoices for goods and services 
were issued after September 1989, while interest was 
calculated on the entire amount in controversy starting 
from September 1989. See App. at 640. However, as the 
District Court observed, Paramount never attempted to 
rebut AAC's calculation, expressed in the affidavit of its 
Vice President, Mr. Genovese. We will not allow it to do so 
on appeal. 
 
Second, Paramount contends that AAC sought 
compensation for goods and services with respect to a 
helicopter numbered 7341, which Paramount never owned 
or operated. However, Paramount never submitted evidence 
to the District Court to counter AAC's affidavit. Although 
Paramount denied knowledge or information about the 
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helicopter in its responses to requests for admission, its 
general denial is insufficient to create a genuine issue of 
fact. See United States v. Bottenfield, 442 F.2d 1007, 1008 
(3d Cir. 1971). 
 
Paramount finally argues that there was a difference 
between the amount claimed in the counterclaim 
($62,788.98 without interest) and the amount stated in the 
November 14 letter ($78,468.02 without interest), despite 
the fact that the counterclaim was filed two days before the 
letter was sent, and that this creates a genuine issue of 
material fact. We disagree, concluding that the District 
Court was correct to award judgment on the breach of 
contract claim based on the Vice President's affidavit about 
the amounts Paramount owed. This is true regardless of 
what the November 14 letter said, because if it was an 
accord it was never satisfied and thus Paramount was 
responsible for the initial obligation. 
 
D. The Setoff 
 
Paramount asserted a setoff based on the same facts that 
grounded its initial claim, i.e., Paramount alleged that the 
1989 crash was caused by Agusta's defective 
manufacturing and maintenance, and that the crash 
caused Paramount significant harm. Paramount argued 
that the helicopter that was the subject of the counterclaim 
also had a vibration problem like the problem that caused 
the crash, although the District Court found the 
maintenance records difficult to decipher on that point. 
Thus, Paramount contends that it is entitled to recover 
from the Agusta defendants for the harm caused by the 
crash-related events, which offsets any amount it might 
owe AAC. The District Court rejected the setoff claim on 
entire controversy grounds. Because we have found the 
entire controversy doctrine inapplicable to Paramount's 
claims, Paramount will be entitled to try to prove its case 
on remand and, if it prevails, it may offset any recovery 
against the amount owed on the counterclaims. In sum, we 
uphold the District Court's determination of the amount 
due on the counterclaims. However, because the setoff may 
be a valid claim, we will vacate the judgment on the 
counterclaims pending resolution of Paramount's claims on 
remand. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment to the Agusta 
defendants on Paramount's tort claims and remand for 
further proceedings. We will affirm the District Court's 
determination of the amount owed on AAC's counterclaims, 
but vacate the judgment on the counterclaims pending 
disposition of Paramount's tort claims. 
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